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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Joshua C. Poppe appeals from the judgment entered upon his conditional 
guilty pleas to possession of cocaine, marijuana, and paraphernalia.  Poppe 
claims the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.  
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
  
Trooper Curt Sproat conducted a traffic stop on a car driven by Poppe 
after he observed Poppe make “a couple quick lane changes” and discovered 
that the car’s registration was expired.  (Tr., p.11, L.20 – p.12, L.14.)  Upon 
making contact with the occupants of the car, Trooper Sproat learned there was 
a female passenger, Magdaline Willis, who indicated “there was a [handgun] in 
the vehicle,” but she had a concealed weapons permit.  (Tr., p.13, Ls.5-16, p.14, 
Ls.7-10; see R., p.7.)  As Poppe handed Trooper Sproat “his identification and 
paperwork, his hand was shaking tremendously, [and he] wasn’t giving [Trooper 
Sproat] much eye contact.”  (Tr., p.13, Ls.19-22.)  Trooper Sproat noticed Willis 
“seemed a little fidgety as well.”  (Tr., p.13, Ls.22-24.)   
“[W]ithin a minute of the traffic stop, based on the abnormal behavior 
[Trooper Sproat] was seeing, [he] called for a canine.”  (Tr., p.14, L.25 – p.15, 
L.4.)  Trooper Kevin Kessler, the canine handler, “arrived within four minutes of 
the traffic stop.”  (Tr., p.15, Ls.17-20, p.17, Ls.1-7; R., p.7.)  Once Trooper 
Kessler arrived, Trooper Sproat advised him there was a gun in the car and 




During the stop, Trooper Sproat asked Poppe to step out of the vehicle 
due to concerns about the gun in the car, and the presence of more than one 
occupant.  (Tr., p.15, Ls.9-16.)  When Poppe got out, Trooper Sproat saw that 
Poppe had a “knife clipped to his pants pocket.”  (Tr., p.15, L.24 – p.16, L.2.)  
Trooper Sproat told Poppe he was “going to take his knife out of his pocket so 
[they] could speak together and [Trooper Sproat] could feel comfortable about 
the situation.”  (Tr., p.16, Ls.5-8.)  Poppe responded, “‘I don’t consent to a 
search,’” after which Trooper Sproat explained he “wasn’t asking to search,” he 
“just wanted to pat him down for [his] safety.”  (Tr., p.16, Ls.8-12.)  Trooper 
Sproat also asked Poppe “if he’d ever been in any trouble before,” and told him 
his “behavior” was consistent with “some kind of criminal behavior, or something 
was going on.”  (Tr., p.17, Ls.20-24.)  Poppe “said a couple years prior he had 
been in a little bit of trouble for some kind of drug use,” but when Trooper Sproat 
asked him if the dog would alert on anything, Poppe denied there was anything 
“illegal” in the vehicle.  (Tr., p.17, L.24 – p.18, L.7.)   
“Once both occupants were out of the vehicle,” Trooper Sproat “went back 
to [his] patrol vehicle” and “ran both occupants through dispatch.”  (Tr., p.18, 
Ls.11-13.)  While waiting for the return from dispatch, the drug dog, Ace, alerted 
on the car.  (Tr., p.20, L.10 – p.21, L.14.)  Before searching the car, Trooper 
Sproat handcuffed Poppe and searched him to make sure Poppe did not have 
any weapons or contraband on him before Trooper Sproat put Poppe into his 
patrol car.  (Tr., p.22, Ls.1-14.)  Trooper Sproat found cocaine in Poppe’s pocket.  




“During the search of the vehicle, [Trooper Sproat] located marijuana [and] 
drug paraphernalia, in a couple different locations.”  (Tr., p.22, Ls.15-19.)  
Trooper Sproat arrested Poppe after finding the “contraband” in the car.  (Tr., 
p.22, Ls.23-25.)  Willis was cited for possession of marijuana and paraphernalia.  
(Tr., p.38, Ls.14-16.)       
The state charged Poppe with possession of a controlled substance 
(cocaine), misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and possession of 
paraphernalia.  (R., pp.9-10, 22-23; see R., pp.7, 62.)  Poppe filed a motion to 
suppress claiming “Trooper Sproat unlawfully extended the traffic stop without 
reasonable suspicion,” and “unlawfully searched [him] after the drug dog altered 
[sic] on the vehicle.”  (R., pp.35-45.)  The court denied Poppe’s motion after an 
evidentiary hearing.  (See generally Tr.; R., pp.49-59.)  Poppe subsequently 
entered conditional guilty pleas to all three charges and the district court entered 
an “Order of Probation on Withheld Judgment.”  (R., pp.61-80, 86-88, 95-97.)  








 Poppe states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court error in denying motion to suppress? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.5 (verbatim).) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
 
Has Poppe failed to show any error in the district court’s determination 
that there was reasonable articulable suspicion to expand the traffic stop in light 
of Poppe’s behavior and the positive drug dog alert, or any error in the 
determination that the cocaine in Poppe’s pocket would have inevitably been 








Poppe Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
 Poppe contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-14.)  More specifically, Poppe argues the district court 
erred in finding (1) reasonable suspicion justified any extension of the traffic stop, 
and (2) the dog alert provided the probable cause necessary to justify the search 
of Poppe even though the search preceded the probable cause for his arrest.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-14.)  Application of the correct legal standards to the 
evidence presented at the suppression hearing and the facts found by the district 
court supports the district court’s conclusion that Poppe was not entitled to 
suppression of any evidence.  Poppe has failed to show otherwise.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.”  State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). The power to assess the 
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw 
factual inferences is vested in the trial court.  State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 
102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 




implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence.  State v. 
Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999). 
 
C. Poppe Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Denial Of His 
Suppression Motion 
 
A traffic stop is a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and, 
because it is limited in scope and duration, “it is analogous to an investigative 
detention and is analyzed under the principles set forth” in Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968).  State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 889, 187 P.3d 1261, 1264 (Ct. 
App. 2008) (citations omitted).  “[T]raffic stops must be temporary and last no 
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”  State v. Henage, 
143 Idaho 655, 658, 152 P.3d 16, 19 (2007) (citation and quotations omitted); 
see also Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015) (“We hold that 
a police stop exceeding the time limit needed to handle the matter for which the 
stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable 
seizures.”).  “There is no rigid time limit for determining when a detention has 
lasted longer than necessary; rather, a court must consider the scope of the 
detention and the law enforcement purposes to be served, as well as the 
duration of the stop.”  State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 
(Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted).  The court must also consider whether the 
officer’s observations during the encounter “and events succeeding the stop” 
gave rise to “legitimate reasons for particularized lines of inquiry and further 
investigation” which justified expanding the investigation to other possible crimes.  




2001).  In addition, it is well-settled that law enforcement may deploy a drug dog 
to sniff the exterior of a lawfully stopped vehicle without suspicion of drug activity 
so long as doing so does not prolong the detention beyond what is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop.  Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); 
State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 183-84, 125 P.3d 536, 539-40 (Ct. App. 
2005); State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363, 17 P.3d 301, 307 (Ct. App. 2000). 
After citing the applicable legal standards (R., pp.52-54), the district court 
rejected Poppe’s argument that Trooper Sproat unlawfully prolonged his 
detention without reasonable suspicion, finding: 
Initially, Trooper Sproat engaged in an investigatory 
detention to inquire about the traffic violation.  His questions about 
their identity, the ownership of the car and general questions about 
any weapons were sufficiently related to the purpose of the stop.  
During that questioning, Trooper Sproat noticed that [Poppe] and 
the passenger were both unusually nervous and fidgety, [Poppe’s] 
hands were trembling and he refused to make eye contact.  These 
facts were sufficient to justify expanding the scope and length of the 
detention to include asking additional questions that might explain 
the behavior and calling a drug dog to the scene – both of which 
could confirm or dispel his suspicions of criminal drug activity.   
 
In addition, during that general questioning, the fact that 
there was a loaded gun in the car provided additional justification 
for the expansion of the scope and length of the initial detention 
because it was reasonable to inquire if, and verify whether, either 
[Poppe] or the passenger were convicted of crimes (and thereby 
prohibited from possessing firearms). 
 
After receiving answers to his questions and after briefly 
conferring with Trooper Kessler and again expressing his belief that 
something odd was going on based on [Poppe’s] and [his] 
passenger’s behavior, Trooper Sproat went back to his patrol car to 
contact dispatch to run information regarding the two people.  While 
Trooper Sproat was talking to dispatch and awaiting its response, 
Trooper Kessler was preparing to run the dog around the vehicle.  It 
appears from the video that these two activities occur 




and see Trooper Kessler talking to the passenger and having her 
get out of the car.  Before any answers can be heard from dispatch, 
Trooper Sproat gets out of his car, talks briefly to Trooper Kessler 
and then Trooper Kessler gets his drug dog out of the car and the 
dog sniffs the exterior of the car, alerting on the left rear side door 
and left rear taillight of the car.  It is not clear when dispatch gets 
back to Trooper Sproat, but there is no indication that he received 
any information from dispatch before he got out of his car to talk to 
Trooper Kessler. 
 
Trooper Sproat testified that the drug dog sniff and the 
request for information and the response from dispatch occurred 
“simultaneously.”  Because Trooper Sproat did not yet have the 
information back from dispatch before the completion of the dog 
sniff, the initial investigatory detention had not been impermissibly 
expanded to allow the drug dog to engage in the perimeter sniff of 
the vehicle.   
 
Here, based on the information provided by [Poppe] and the 
passenger, the initial investigatory detention was permissibly 
expanded to permit questioning on circumstances unrelated to the 
stop.  Because the drug dog alerted before the termination of the 
initial detention, the detention was not impermissibly expanded and 
the Court declines to grant [Poppe’s] motion on this ground. 
 
(R., pp.54-56).   
 Poppe argues that the district court’s finding was erroneous because 
“nervous demeanor during a law enforcement encounter is of limited significance 
in establishing the presence of reasonable suspicion because it is common for 
people to exhibit signs of nervousness when confronted with law enforcement 
regardless of criminal activity.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.7.)  Poppe cites State v. 
Zuniga, 143 Idaho 431, 435, 146 P.3d 697, 701 (Ct. App. 2006), State v. Gibson, 
141 Idaho 277, 285-286, 108 P.3d 424, 432-433 (Ct. App. 2005), and several 
federal circuit court cases in support of this argument.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8.)  
While the Court in both Zuniga and Gibson noted that nervousness is of limited 




establish error by the district court in this case because it ignores the context in 
which the court discussed Poppe’s and Willis’s behavior.  Unlike in Zuniga, which 
involved a seizure that was not based on a traffic violation, Poppe was lawfully 
detained pursuant to a traffic stop; he was not detained because of general 
“nervousness.”  The district court’s discussion about Poppe’s behavior was in the 
context of a valid traffic stop, and the district court recognized that Poppe’s 
behavior, which included being “unusually nervous and fidgety,” having trembling 
hands, and refusing to make eye contact, in conjunction with the presence of a 
gun in the car, was the appropriate subject of Trooper Sproat’s questioning 
during a properly initiated traffic stop.  Trooper Sproat did not, as Poppe claims, 
“abandon” the initial reason for the stop by asking questions unrelated to the 
reason for the stop.  See State v. Hays, 159 Idaho 476, 362 P.3d 551 (Ct. App. 
2015) (citation and quotations omitted) (questioning unrelated to purpose of stop 
appropriate so long as it does not “measurably extend the duration of the stop”); 
Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496, 198 P.3d at 134 (observations during encounter 
may give rise to other legitimate areas of inquiry and investigation).  Rather, the 
questions were permissible given the circumstances, and the evidence shows 
that Trooper Sproat continued to engage in tasks consistent with a standard 
traffic stop by running Poppe’s and Willis’s information through dispatch after he 
asked Poppe the questions about which Poppe complains.1   
                                                 
1 Trooper Sproat’s tasks also included confirming that Willis had a valid 
concealed weapons permit.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.15-24.)  To the extent Poppe is 
arguing that Trooper Sproat did not do so, his claim is belied by the record.  




Gibson, on which Poppe also relies, does not inform the analysis because 
Gibson did not involve a claim that law enforcement unlawfully prolonged a traffic 
stop without reasonable suspicion.  Rather, the Court’s discussion of Gibson’s 
nervous demeanor was related to whether such behavior provided probable 
cause to believe Gibson had drugs on his person based on a positive dog alert 
on the automobile he was in when the officers detained him.  141 Idaho at 285, 
108 P.3d at 432.  The Court concluded it was insufficient given the alternative 
explanation for his demeanor, which was that he “had been stopped by police 
after allowing a fourteen-year-old to drive his vehicle in the middle of the night,” 
and “thus had reasons to fear repercussions for this conduct with a minor quite 
apart from speculative apprehension that the officers would discover drugs.”  Id.  
Moreover, it is well-settled that reasonable suspicion for an investigatory 
detention is a lower standard than the probable cause standard necessary for a 
search.  State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009).      
The Court of Appeals’ recent opinion in Hays, 159 Idaho 476, 362 P.3d 
551, supports the district court’s conclusion.  Hays was stopped for exceeding 
the speed limit.  Hays, 159 Idaho at ___, 362 P.3d at 553.  “Upon making 
contact, [the officer] noticed that Hays appeared to be very nervous.  He asked 
her questions about her nervousness and destination.”  Id.  After requesting 
Hays’s license and registration, and learning Hays did not have proof of 
insurance, the officer advised Hays “that although he was not going to cite her for 
speeding, he would give her a citation for failure to show proof of valid insurance 




Id.  The officer returned to his patrol car to conduct a license check and issue a 
citation, but before doing so, he requested a drug dog.  Id.   
 “Approximately seven minutes into the stop, the driver’s license check 
revealed that Hays had a valid and clear license.”  Hays, 159 Idaho at ___, 362 
P.3d at 553.  The officer “then began to write the citation.”  Id.  “Approximately 
ten minutes into the stop,” the canine deputy arrived on scene and was advised 
that Hays “was unusually nervous.”  Id.  The canine deputy “engaged in 
conversation with Hays where he asked her if there were drugs in her car,” and 
Hays admitted there was marijuana.  Id.   
 “Approximately fourteen minutes into the stop,” the officer “re-approached 
Hays’ vehicle and asked her to exit and stand near his patrol car.”  Hays, 159 
Idaho at ___, 362 P.3d at 553.  The officer “explained the citation to Hays and 
told her that he called for a drug dog because she was acting nervous.”  Id.  
“Meanwhile,” the canine deputy “walked the drug dog around Hays’ car and the 
dog alerted as to the presence of drugs.”  Id.   
 The Court of Appeals rejected Hays’s argument that she was entitled to 
suppression on the theory that the traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged without 
reasonable suspicion, first noting that, “[i]n addition to determining whether to 
issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission ordinarily includes inquiries incident to 
the stop, which typically involve ‘checking the driver’s license, determining 
whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the 
automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.’”  Hays, 159 Idaho at ___, 362 




officer to routinely ask about a driver’s purpose and destination.”  Hays, 159 
Idaho at ___, 362 P.3d at 555 (citation omitted).  “[G]eneral questioning on topics 
unrelated to the purpose of the stop” is also appropriate “‘so long as unrelated 
inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.’”   Id. (quoting 
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) (brackets omitted)).  “Like a Terry 
stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is 
determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that 
warranted the stop, and attend to related safety concerns.”  Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. 
at 1614 (citations omitted).  Applying these principles to the facts before it, the 
Court in Hays concluded:  “The officer’s inquiry into Hays’ nervousness, whether 
related to officer safety, Hays’ safety, or the safety of the highways, did not 
violate Hays’ Fourth Amendment rights.”  Hays, 159 Idaho at ___, 362 P.3d at 
556 (citing Rodriguez, supra).   
The same is true in Poppe’s case.  The district court correctly concluded 
that Poppe’s unusual nervousness and the presence of a handgun in the car 
were appropriate topics for Trooper Sproat to address both in the context of 
officer safety related to the traffic stop itself and in relation to reasonable 
suspicion of criminal drug activity.      
 Poppe also complains that Trooper Sproat “lacked a reasonable suspicion 
that could justify removing [him] from the vehicle, frisking him and interrogating 
him about drug use.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.9.)  For the reasons already stated, 
Trooper Sproat’s questions were permissible.  Poppe’s complaints about 




did not need reasonable suspicion in order to remove Poppe from the car 
because, “during a lawful traffic stop, the officer may instruct the driver to exit the 
vehicle or to remain inside.  This procedure is within the police officer’s discretion 
and is not otherwise unlawful.”  Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 363, 17 P.3d at 307 
(citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977)).  As for whether 
Trooper Sproat had a lawful basis for frisking Poppe due to the presence of a 
knife, the complaint is irrelevant because it was not the basis for Poppe’s motion 
to suppress (see R., pp.38-44), nor is there any basis for concluding the frisk 
unlawfully prolonged the stop.   
 Poppe next contends that the district court erred in concluding that the 
drug dog sniff did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.10-
12.)  The evidence does not support this assertion.  As found by the district court, 
“the drug dog sniff and the request for information and the response from 
dispatch occurred ‘simultaneously.’”  (R., p.56.)  Poppe does not challenge this 
factual finding, but instead appears to argue that the stop was unlawfully 
prolonged because Trooper Sproat delayed in contacting dispatch and did not 
immediately start writing a ticket while awaiting a response from dispatch.  
(Appellant’s brief, p.11.)  Poppe’s first argument is, therefore, predicated on the 
merits of his claim that Trooper Sproat could not question him outside the vehicle 
about drug concerns based on Poppe’s unusually nervous behavior.  For the 
reasons stated, this argument fails.  Poppe’s second argument fails because 
whether Trooper Sproat immediately started writing a ticket, or how quickly he 




the stop would not have been complete until dispatch returned regardless of 
whether a citation could have been written or not.  Since the alert happened 
simultaneously with the return from dispatch, even if a citation was complete, 
Trooper Sproat could have continued the detention based on the alert.  Gibson, 
141 Idaho at 281, 108 P.3d at 428 (“When a reliable drug-detection dog indicates 
that a lawfully stopped automobile contains the odor of controlled substances, 
the officer has probable cause to believe that there are drugs in the automobile 
and may search it without a warrant.”).  Poppe has failed to show the district 
court erred in rejecting his argument that the traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged 
without reasonable articulable suspicion.   
 Poppe has also failed to show error in the district court’s conclusion that 
Poppe was not entitled to suppression of the cocaine Trooper Sproat found when 
he searched Poppe prior to placing him in his patrol car.  The district court found 
that, although “placing [Poppe] in handcuffs in the back of the patrol car during 
the dog sniff amounted to a de facto arrest,” the Idaho Supreme Court has 
recognized that as long as probable cause exists to arrest a person, a valid 
search incident to arrest can be conducted prior to the arrest.”  (R., p.57 (citing 
State v. Schwartz, 133 Idaho 463, 468, 988 P.2d 689, 694 (1999), State v. Cox, 
136 Idaho 858, 863, 41 P.3d 744, 749 (Ct. App. 2002), and State v. Martinez, 
129 Idaho 426, 431, 925 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Ct. App. 1996).)  “This is true so long 
as the search and the arrest are substantially contemporaneous, and the fruits of 
the search are not required to establish probable cause for the arrest.”  (R., p.57 




2000), and State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 115, 118-119, 266 P.3d 1220, 1223-1224 
(Ct. App. 2011).)  
 Applying the foregoing legal principles to the facts, the district court 
concluded that, while “there was no probable cause to arrest” Poppe at the time 
he was searched, there was probable cause to search the car based on the dog 
alert, and the marijuana discovered during the search of the car provided 
probable cause to arrest Poppe and search him incident to that arrest.  (R., 
pp.57-58.)  In other words, the district court reasoned, the cocaine in Poppe’s 
pocket would have inevitably been discovered pursuant to a search incident to 
arrest.  (R., p.58.)  Poppe challenges the district court’s conclusion, contending 
“[t]his Court should not combine the search incident to arrest exception with the 
inevitable discovery doctrine” in this case because, he argues, that “absent the 
unlawful discovery of the cocaine, [he] probably would not have been arrested 
and, instead, cited and released like” Willis.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-14 
(emphasis original).)  Poppe effectively asks this Court to ignore the law.  The 
Court should decline to do so.   
 “Searches incident to arrest are one of the well-established exceptions to 
the warrant requirement.”  State v. LaMay, 140 Idaho 835, 838, 103 P.3d 448, 
451 (2004) (citations omitted).  The inevitable discovery doctrine, on the other 
hand, is an exception to the exclusionary rule.  Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 
440-444 (1984); State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 915, 136 P.3d 379, 386 (Ct. 
App. 2006) (“An exception to the exclusionary rule is the inevitable discovery 




discuss both exceptions in relation to Poppe’s suppression motion and doing so 
did not mean the court improperly “combine[d]” the two, or that application of 
both exceptions constitutes an unlawful expansion of the search incident to arrest 
exception as Poppe claims.  (Appellant’s brief, p.14.)  Once Troopers Sproat and 
Kessler discovered the marijuana in the car, they had probable cause to arrest 
Poppe and a search incident to his arrest would have revealed the cocaine 
already discovered in the absence of probable cause.  Poppe’s challenge to this 
analysis is predicated on his speculation that he “probably would not have been 
arrested and, instead, cited and released like [Willis],” but for “the unlawful 
discovery of the cocaine.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-14 (emphasis original).)  The 
district court correctly rejected this argument noting that “simply because the 
officers chose not to arrest the passenger does not negate the fact that they had 
probable cause to arrest [Poppe] once the marijuana was found in the vehicle.”  
(R., pp.58-59.)  This conclusion is analytically correct.  “If the prosecution can 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or 
inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means,” then exclusion is not 
the proper remedy for any constitutional violation.  Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.  
“Although those lawful means need not be the result of a wholly independent 
investigation, they must be the result of some action that actually took place (or 
was in the process of taking place) that would inevitably lead to the discovery of 
the unlawfully obtained evidence.”  State v. Rowland, 158 Idaho 784, 787, 352 
P.3d 506, 510 (Ct. App. 2015) (citations omitted).  The district court correctly 




“ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means” that 
actually took place, i.e., a search incident to a lawful arrest based on the 
marijuana found in the car.  Poppe’s speculation that Trooper Sproat might have 
done something different but for the cocaine is inadequate to establish error in 
the district court’s conclusion that the state met its burden.2   
 Poppe has failed to show any basis for reversing the district court’s order 




The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon Poppe’s conditional guilty pleas to possession of cocaine, marijuana, and 
paraphernalia.   
 DATED this 8th day of July, 2016. 
 
 
      _/s/ Jessica M. Lorello__ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 
      Deputy Attorney General 
                                                 
2 Trooper Sproat testified that he cited and released Willis to drive the vehicle 
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